City of New York v. Verizon New York, Inc. by Leigh, Michael T.
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 54 
Issue 4 Locating the School-to-Prison Pipeline Article 12 
January 2010 
City of New York v. Verizon New York, Inc. 
Michael T. Leigh 
New York Law School Class of 2010 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Law and Society 
Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and Local 
Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael T. Leigh, City of New York v. Verizon New York, Inc., 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1171 (2009-2010). 
This Case Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
voLUMe 54 | 2009/10
MICHAEL T. LEIGH
City of New York v. Verizon New York, Inc.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Michael T. Leigh is a 2010 J.D. candidate at New York Law School.
1171
1172
ciTY oF New York v. veriZoN New York, iNc.
 “The principle . . . is fundamental that ‘every public grant of property, or of 
privileges or franchises, if ambiguous, is to be construed against the grantee and in 
favor of the public[.]’”1 Because the primary purpose of municipal streets is travel,2 
the use of streets for some other purpose constitutes a special privilege for which a 
private person or corporation must acquire a grant of permission from the appropriate 
public authority.3 The ability to grant such special permissions vests in the state 
legislature, but the state can delegate its authority to municipalities upon an express 
legislative provision to that effect.4 The New York legislature has done so in many 
cases, allowing municipal authorities to grant special permissions to use public rights-
of-way.5 The reason for this is to allow local authorities to assume management of 
local public rights-of-way—both to ensure that rights-of-way remain usable for their 
primary purpose and to manage use by private entities so that the public will realize 
all potential benefits.6 Adequate and reasonable compensation for private use of 
public rights-of-way is one of the core benefits to which the public is entitled, and 
securing such compensation is a core responsibility of municipal authorities.7 
Unfortunately, judicial interpretation of telecommunications companies’ permissions 
to use New York City streets has enabled those companies to use public resources 
without paying adequate and reasonable compensation for that use.
 In City of New York v. Verizon New York, Inc., the Supreme Court of New York 
addressed the issue of whether Verizon had the proper authority to use New York 
City streets and rights-of-way to lay fiber-optic cable, and if so, whether it adequately 
1. Holmes Elec. Protective Co. v. Williams, 228 N.Y. 407, 447 (1920) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. Pullman’s Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 49 (1891) and citing Charles River Bridge 
v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 544 (1837)).
2. 64 N.Y. Jur. 2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 1; Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. City of New York, 152 
N.Y. 257, 265 (1897) (highways “were constructed for the passage of persons and the carriage of 
goods.”).
3. See People ex rel. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 247 N.Y. 281, 285 (1928) (“A 
street crossing franchise consists of the right to cross a street, and to use it, when but for a grant of the 
right to do so from competent public authority it would be a trespass.”).
4. Village of Carthage v. Cent. N.Y. Tel. & Tel. Co., 185 N.Y. 448, 452 (1906).
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. City Law § 20(10) (McKinney 2003) (“Subject to the constitution and general laws 
of this state, every city is empowered . . . [t]o grant franchises or rights to use the streets, waters, water 
front, public ways and public places of the city.”); N.Y., N.Y., Charter ch. 14, § 363(a) (2008) 
(“Franchises shall be awarded only in accordance with the provisions of an authorizing resolution 
adopted by the council . . . .”); Buffalo, N.Y., Charter ch. 413, art. I, § 4(A) (1996) (“No person shall 
place, put or deposit in or upon any public street . . . any substance or material whatsoever, except as 
permitted by ordinance.”).
6. Frederick E. Ellrod III & Nicholas P. Miller, Property Rights, Federalism, and the Public Rights-of-Way, 
26 Seattle U. L. Rev. 475, 483 (2003).
7. See id. at 490. Other facets of local management of public rights-of-way include: location and depth of 
placement of private equipment, provisions for traffic safety and disruption, indemnification of the local 
government for injuries to people and property, and relocation of private equipment and facilities for 
public improvements. Id. at 487.
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and reasonably compensated the city for that use.8 The court held that Verizon had a 
state franchise granting it “an interest in perpetuity,” but that the record was 
insufficient to determine whether Verizon’s compensation to the city was adequate 
and reasonable.9 With this holding, the court followed a line of cases that essentially 
undermines the inalienability of city streets, and frustrates the public’s expectation of 
adequate and reasonable compensation for the private use of these public resources.
 This case comment contends that although the holding of Verizon follows New 
York courts’ interpretation of Transportation Corporations Law (“TCL”) section 27, 
this legal standard has slowly and systematically undermined the principle that city 
streets belong to the people and that use and occupation of them must comport with 
public interests. By defining the grant of permission by the municipality to lay electrical 
conductor lines under city streets as the final step in the granting of a state franchise in 
perpetuity,10 the courts have removed the city’s ability to regulate the use and occupation 
of its streets for any company incorporated under the TCL. A better interpretation of 
the rights of corporations under section 27 is one that requires the city to allow 
telecommunications companies to access public rights-of-way, while permitting the 
city to set reasonable conditions for such access so as to preserve the inalienability of 
public streets and ensure reasonable and adequate compensation for that access.
 TCL section 2 classifies transportation corporations into eight types, one of 
which is “[a] telegraph corporation, a telephone corporation or a telegraph and 
telephone corporation.”11 Courts have held that while incorporation under TCL 
section 3 gives an entity the “same perfunctory” franchise12 to operate as any business 
incorporated under New York Business Corporations Law,13 under TCL section 27, 
telegraph and telephone corporations are given certain additional rights.14 Specifically, 
such corporations are permitted to “erect, construct and maintain” the necessary 
8. City of New York v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., No. 402961/03, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *1 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County July 7, 2008). The court also faced questions of whether, if Verizon had such access to city 
streets, that franchise was valid as to fiber optic cables used by Verizon; the geographical scope of that 
franchise; and whether the franchise was preempted by the Federal Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 253. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *7–8.
9. Id. at *40. The court also determined that further briefing was required on the issue of the geographical 
extent of Verizon’s franchise. Id. at *28.
10. Id. at *21. 
11. N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 2 (McKinney 1996).
12. TCL section 4 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he business corporation law applies to a corporation 
heretofore or hereafter formed under this chapter . . . .” N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 4 (McKinney 1996). 
Section 202 of the Business Corporation Law provides for the general, or “perfunctory” powers of a 
corporation, such as, inter alia, perpetual duration; to sue and be sued, to have a corporate seal; to make 
contracts; and to adopt; amend; or repeal bylaws. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a) (McKinney 2003).
13. See, e.g., People’s Cable Corp., v. City of Rochester, 334 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 
1972). 
14. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Town of N. Hempstead , 41 N.Y.2d 691, 698 (1977) (“The assent of the town was in no 
wise required to authorize the Telephone Company to erect its poles . . . .”); Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 4572, at *18–19; People’s Cable Corp., 334 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
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infrastructure “upon, over or under any of the public roads, streets and highways . . . .”15 
To construct its infrastructure upon or over public streets, a telephone or telegraph 
corporation needs no further permission than that which it already possesses under 
TCL section 27.16 However, by the language of an 1881 statute that was added to 
TCL section 27,17 a corporation needs a special franchise18 from the city to lay lines 
under public streets.19
 In 1884 and 1885, the state legislature passed two “Subway Laws,” which together 
required that all telephone and telegraph companies operating in any city with at 
least 500,000 inhabitants remove aboveground lines to underground.20 The Subway 
15. N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 27 (McKinney 1996).
16. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *18–19 (holding that Metro, New York and New Jersey 
Telephone Company, Long Island Telephone Company, and Staten Island Telephone Company 
acquired, by virtue of incorporation under TCL section 27, the unconditional rights to erect lines upon 
city streets); N.Y. Tel. Co., 41 N.Y.2d at 693 (“Under the provisions of section 27 of the Transportation 
Corporations Law, New York Telephone Company when it was incorporated in 1896 received from the 
State of New York an unconditional right to erect and maintain poles for its lines upon public streets and 
highways . . . .”); Village of Carthage, 185 N.Y. at 451 (“It has long been the settled law of this state that 
telegraph and telephone companies derive the right to erect their poles and string their wires directly 
from the state.”). 
17. In re N.Y. Indep. Tel. Co., 118 N.Y.S. 290, 296–97 (1st Dep’t 1909), aff ’d, 200 N.Y. 527 (1910). The 
language of the 1881 legislation was added to TCL section 102 (now section 27). Id.; N.Y. Transp. 
Corp. Law § 27. 
18. Courts use the term “franchise” in several senses, two of which are pertinent to Verizon. One sense is the 
grant of permission from the state to act as a corporation, generally. See, e.g., People’s Cable Corp., 334 
N.Y.S.2d at 975 (“The right to exist as a corporation and the privilege of using public streets for its 
equipment and lines are both called franchises, but each grants a different privilege.”); City of New York v. 
Bryan, 196 N.Y. 158, 163 (1909) (franchise to construct and operate a railroad on city streets is different 
from the franchise to be a corporation). Another is permission from municipal authorities for a private 
entity to use public rights-of-way, sometimes called a “secondary” or “special” franchise. See People’s Cable 
Corp., 334 N.Y.S.2d at 975; Bryan, 196 N.Y. at 163; see also Holmes Elec. Protective Co. 228 N.Y. at 428 
(Pound, J., dissenting); Village of Stillwater v. Hudson Val. Ry. Co., 225 N.Y. 144, 150–51 (1931) (“The 
secondary franchise, which in these cases is the consent or permission given by local authorities for the use 
of its streets or highways, is not the franchise by and under which the corporation exists and has the right 
to function as a corporate being.”). This second sense of the word “franchise” means a right or privilege to 
access conferred by the government to “do that which does not belong to the citizens” of a city “by common 
right.” 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises form Public Entities § 1 (2008). The permission the corporation is required 
to attain from the city under TCL section 27 is in the vein of a “special franchise.” 
19. The pertinent language of TCL section 27 reads:
 Any such corporation is authorized, from time to time, to construct and lay lines of 
electrical conductors under ground in any city . . . subject to all the provisions of law in 
reference to such companies not inconsistent with this section; provided that such 
corporation shall, before laying any such line in any city . . . first obtain from the 
common council of cities . . . permission to use the streets within such city . . . for the 
purposes herein set forth.
 N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 27; Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *19 (“TCL § 27 also grants 
the right to place wires and equipment underground on condition that the telephone company obtain 
permission of the local common council.”); In re N.Y. Indep. Tel. Co., 118 N.Y.S. at 297.
20. See Subway Laws, 1884 N.Y. Laws 647; 1885 N.Y. Laws 852; Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at 
*4 n.3 (stating that overhead lines were deemed a nuisance by local and state authorities).
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Laws stated that such removal was to be accomplished “subject to the rules and 
regulations” of the local authorities and placed oversight of the process in a local 
Board of Commissioners of Electrical Subways.21
 Verizon’s predecessor through various consolidations, Metropolitan Telephone 
and Telegraph Company (“Metro”), was incorporated as a telephone and telegraph 
company in 1880.22 Incorporation granted Metro a state franchise to erect and 
maintain necessary infrastructure, including telegraph and telephone lines, upon any 
public streets of the city.23 In 1881, Metro was granted permission by the New York 
City Board of Aldermen24 to lay electrical conductor lines beneath city streets.25 
Metro began laying lines underground in Manhattan and the areas of the Bronx that 
were at the time part of the city.26 The city’s permission27 contained no temporal 
21. See Subway Laws, 1885 N.Y. Laws 852, 853. 
22. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *1; Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and 
Assembly of the State of New York Appointed to Investigate Telephone and Telegraph 
Companies, S. 38-133, 133rd Sess., at 1206 (N.Y. 1910) [hereinafter Senate Report] (Statement 
Respecting Franchises of New York Telephone Company); Senate Report, supra, at 1209 (Op. Corp. 
Counsel of New York City (1910)). Metro incorporated under the Telegraph Act of 1848 (1848 N.Y. 
Laws 392), which was the precursor state statute to the TCL. See State of New York ex rel. N.Y. Elec. 
Lines Co. v. Squire, 145 U.S. 175 (1892).
23. N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 27; Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *1; see N.Y. Tel. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 
at 693 (noting that the corporation received an unconditional right to erect and maintain poles for its 
lines upon public streets and highways as per N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 27).
24. At the time, the Board of Aldermen was the “common council” of New York City. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *2 (citing N.Y., N.Y., Charter art. 2, § 2 (1873)); Ghee v. N. Union Gas Co., 
158 N.Y. 510, 516 (1899) (citing 1872 N.Y. Laws 1226).
25. Bd. of Aldermen of the City of N.Y. Res. on Dec. 13, 1881 [hereinafter 1881 Resolution], reprinted in 
Senate Report, supra note 22, at 1207. The resolution read as follows:
 Resolved, That permission be, and hereby is granted to the Metropolitan Telephone and 
Telegraph Company to use the streets within the city of New York for the purpose of 
constructing and laying lines of electrical conductors underground, from time to time, 
in tubes or otherwise, and for constructing, maintaining, and using such streets, from 
time to time, upon, above or below the surface of the ground, boxes, vaults or other 
fixtures suitable for distributing and testing, from time to time, the wires and insulators 
of said lines, and for access thereto. All excavations in streets, removals and replacements 
of pavements or sidewalks, shall be done under and according to the direction of the 
Commissioner of Public Works. The said Company in acting under this permission, 
shall be subject to so much of the provisions of Article XLI of chapter eight of the 
Revised Ordinances of 1880 as requires that one wire in each route shall be reserved for 
the use of the police and one for the fire-alarm telegraph, without charge to the city 
and county of New York. For each street opened and used by the Company, under this 
permission, for the purpose of laying therein its lines of electrical conductors, it shall 
pay to the city a sum equal to one cent for each lineal foot of such street occupied.
 Id.
26. Id. at 1207. Brooklyn, Queens, what is now Staten Island, and the remaining portions of the Bronx were 
incorporated as part of the city under the Charter of 1898. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *3. 
27. The Verizon parties and the court refer to the 1881 permission as a “franchise.” E.g., Verizon, 2008 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *18. TCL section 27 refers to “permission” from the municipal common council, 
rather than a “franchise.” N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 27. However, the case law under both former 
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limitation on its face, but did provide for compensation to be paid to the city at one 
cent per lineal foot of street occupied.28 However, at the time the Board granted 
Metro permission, the 1873 City Charter in effect provided that no city franchise be 
awarded for a term exceeding five years.29 Through a series of mergers during the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, Metro became New York Telephone Company (“NYT”), 
and by 1909 all the telephone and telegraph companies operating in the city were 
consolidated under that name.30 Eventually, NYT became Verizon, which continued 
to lay lines above and below ground in all five counties of the city.31
 In 2003, the city filed suit requesting declaratory judgment that Verizon’s 
occupancy of city streets exceeded the temporal limitation requirement within City 
Charter franchise provisions, and, therefore, it had to obtain a new franchise from 
the city.32 Verizon moved to dismiss the action, which the court treated as a motion 
for summary judgment.33 The court pieced together its decision from the text of 
TCL section 27, precedent interpreting that section, the 1881 Board of Aldermen 
franchise, the Subway Laws, and interpretation of federal telecommunications laws.34 
The court held that Verizon possessed a state franchise in perpetuity to lay fiber 
optic cable under city streets.35
 Further, the court held that the 1881 permission from the city Board of Aldermen 
was the final step in creating a state franchise under TCL section 2736 and, as a state 
TCL section 102 and the current TCL section 27 uses the term “franchise” to describe the required 
municipal permission. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *19 (quoting City of Rome v. Verizon 
N.Y., Inc., No. CA2002-00241, slip op. at 6 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County Jan. 24, 2006), aff ’d, 828 
N.Y.S.2d 226 (4th Dep’t 2007)). This comment will also refer to the municipal permission as a 
franchise. 
28. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *3; 1881 Resolution, supra note 25. 
29. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *3 n.2.
30. Id. at *4–6; see also Senate Report, supra note 22, at 1206–09. The various companies eventually 
absorbed by NYT (and therefore Verizon) were the New York and New Jersey Telephone Company, the 
Long Island Telephone Company, and the Staten Island Telephone Company. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 4572, at *4–5. Although Metro obtained permission to lay electrical conductor lines under city 
streets, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the other companies, which operated in the cities of 
Brooklyn, Queens, and what is now Staten Island (all of which were separate from New York City at the 
time), see supra note 26, obtained a franchise from their respective cities’ common council to lay electrical 
conductor lines under city streets. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *5.
31. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *6.
32. Id. at *7–8. Verizon removed the action to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, but the district 
court remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing City of New York v. Verizon 
N.Y., Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). The city then filed an amended complaint in New 
York Supreme Court on November 15, 2004, the outcome of which is the subject of this comment. 
Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *7.
33. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *1. 
34. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006).
35. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *41.
36. Id. at *20–21 (citing City of Rome v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., No. CA2002-00241, slip op. at 6 (Sup. Ct. 
Oneida County Jan. 24, 2006), aff ’d, 828 N.Y.S.2d 226 (4th Dep’t 2007)).
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franchise, the five-year limitation in the 1873 City Charter was inapplicable. Thus, 
Verizon’s permission to lay lines under city streets was unrestricted as to duration.37 
The court further held that Verizon’s permission extended to Brooklyn because the 
1885 Subway Laws required all telephone companies to remove their aboveground 
lines to underground.38 Finally, the court held that neither TCL section 27 nor the 
city’s permission was preempted by federal telecommunications law39 because the 
state franchise requirements for installing lines below city streets was competitively 
neutral, as required by federal law.40 By holding that Verizon enjoys a perpetual 
franchise to occupy city streets, the court has solidified a long line of case law in 
New York that essentially removes the inalienable rights of the public to city streets 
with regard to telecommunications companies, and impairs the public’s ability to 
secure adequate and reasonable compensation for private use of public rights-of-way.
 Every New York City Charter since the Charter of 1873 has included a provision 
restricting the duration of franchises that can be conferred by the city to a private 
37. Id. at *21. 
38. Id. at *27. For this determination the court cited Holmes Elec. Protective Co., which held that “[t]he 
consent of the city authorities was not necessary to do that which the law commanded.” Holmes Elec. 
Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 422. Because the summary judgment record did not indicate whether Staten 
Island, Queens, and those areas of the Bronx not part of the city when the Subways Laws were enacted 
had populations of at least 500,000 inhabitants, the court refrained from holding that Verizon possessed 
a grant to lay lines underground in those portions of the city since Verizon’s predecessors-in-interest for 
those areas neglected to gain the city’s permission pursuant to TCL section 27. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *27–28.
39. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 253, provides that:
 No State or local statute or regulation or other State or local legal requirement, may 
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate 
or intrastate telecommunications service . . . . Nothing in this section shall affect the 
ability of a State to impose, on a competitively neutral basis . . . requirements necessary 
to preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure 
the continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of 
consumers . . . . Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local 
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable 
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral and non-
discriminatory basis, for use of public rights-of-way on a non-discriminatory basis, if 
the compensation required is publicly disclosed by such government.
 47 U.S.C. §§ 253(a)–(c) (2006); Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *32–35.
40. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *34–35. The city contended that if the court held that Verizon 
possessed a franchise in perpetuity from the 1881 city permission, it would provide Verizon with a 
competitive advantage not enjoyed by its competitors in the telecommunications industry, and thus 
federal telecommunications law would preempt the franchise. Id. at *31–32. The court rejected this 
contention because to do so would “[stand] the Congressional intent [of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996] on its head” by holding that “more regulation, greater barriers and higher costs are necessary to 
establish competitive equality between Verizon and other telecommunications providers.” Id. at *33–34. 
The preamble to the Act stated that it was “[a]n Act to promote competition and reduce regulation in order 
to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and 
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies[.]” (emphasis added). Id. at 
*33 (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; Bellsouth 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1175 (11th Cir. 2001)).
1178
ciTY oF New York v. veriZoN New York, iNc.
individual or corporation for access to public rights-of-way.41 Section 18 of the 
Charter of 1873 provided that no franchise granted by the city could last longer than 
five years.42 Municipalities in New York have long argued that these provisions, 
which also exist in the charters for cities other than New York City, control the 
duration of franchises that a municipality can authorize.43 Courts, however, have 
accepted or rejected this argument based principally on when a telecommunications 
company was incorporated and whether the municipal permission contained an 
express temporal limitation.44
 In Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co., the Appellate Division held that under the 
TCL, the secondary franchise by the city to lay gas pipes under city streets was the 
final step in creating a state franchise.45 The court stated, “the franchise comes from 
the state, but the act of the local authorities . . . constitutes the act upon which the 
law operates to create the franchise.”46 The effect of declaring the franchise to be 
wholly from the state was to remove it from New York City franchise provisions, 
including the temporal limitation requirement.
 Additionally, in People v. O’Brien, the Court of Appeals held that permission 
from the city, unless by its terms limited in duration, created a franchise in 
41. See Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *3 n.2; Senate Report, supra note 22, at 1210.
42. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *3 n.2. This was the charter that was in effect in 1881 when 
the city Board of Aldermen granted Metro permission to lay electrical conductor lines under city streets. 
The 1873 Charter remained in effect until the Charter of 1882, which in turn remained in effect until 
January 1, 1898, when the Greater New York City Charter, which consolidated New York City, 
Brooklyn, Queens, what is now Staten Island, and the remainder of the Bronx into the Greater City of 
New York. The 1898 Charter restricted city franchises to no longer than twenty-five years; the current 
Charter restricts franchises to at most fifty years. Id. at *3 n.2; Ghee, 158 N.Y. at 512; N.Y., N.Y., Ch. 15 
Charter § 383(h)(2). 
43. See, e.g., Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *10–11; People’s Cable Corp. 334 N.Y.S.2d at 974 
(cable company sought to annul ordinance granting a franchise to a rival cable company as being contrary 
to Rochester City Charter provisions); Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 421–22 (city argued that 
telegraph company was occupying city streets contrary to city franchise requirements); Ghee, 158 N.Y. at 
512–13 (city argued that charter gave commissioner of public buildings, lighting and supplies and 
commissioner of highways the authority to grant consents to use streets). 
44. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *26–27 (because NYNJT, LIT, and SIT all were incorporated 
prior to the Subway Laws, they were not required to obtain consent from the appropriate municipalities 
to lay lines underground); see Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 422–23 (holding that because 
Holmes Electric Protective Company was incorporated prior to the Subways Laws it was not required to 
obtain permission from the city, but had the company been incorporated subsequent to the Subway 
Laws it would have had to abide by the Subway Laws, and obtain city permission under charter 
requirements for municipal franchises); In re N.Y. Indep. Tel. Co., 118 N.Y.S. at 294–95 (holding that 
New York Independent Telephone and Telegraph Company had no rights in the city because it was 
incorporated subsequent to the 1898 Charter, but that its predecessor-in-interest, the Mercantile Electric 
Company, had rights in the city because it was incorporated prior to the 1898 Charter).
45. 158 N.Y. 510, 513 (1899).
46. Id. Analogously, in Bryan, the Court of Appeals stated that a corporation’s ability to construct and 
operate a railroad in city streets was a state franchise and that the secondary franchise from the city was 
“[t]herefore . . . but a step in the grant of a single, indivisible franchise . . . .” Bryan, 196 N.Y. 158 at 
166.
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perpetuity.47 There, the New York City Board of Aldermen passed a resolution 
allowing the Broadway Surface Railroad Company to use tracks on city streets, and 
placed no temporal limitation on that grant.48 Because the city did not expressly limit 
its grant, the court held that it was a franchise in perpetuity.49 The holdings of Ghee 
and O’Brien were recently affirmed in City of Rome v. Verizon New York, Inc.50
 In Holmes Elec. Protective Co., the Court of Appeals held that a telegraph company, 
incorporated prior to the enactment of the Subways Laws, was not required to regain 
permission from the city.51 In January of 1883, the plaintiff, through acquisition of 
Holmes Burglar Alarm Telegraph Company and the American District Telegraph 
Company, furnished “protective services” to homes and businesses throughout the 
city.52 Until 1891, the plaintiff maintained its wires over and upon public streets and 
rooftops of residences and businesses.53 In 1891, pursuant to the requirements of the 
Subway Laws, the plaintiff replaced its overhead lines with lines underground.54 In 
1910, the city threatened to remove the underground wires, arguing that the plaintiff 
lacked a secondary franchise from the city under TCL section 102 (now section 27).55
 The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts to find in plaintiff ’s favor.56 The 
court held that because Holmes incorporated prior to the enactment of the 1884 and 
1885 Subway Laws, its ability to place lines below city streets was governed only by 
the Telegraph Act.57 The court decided that the requirements for a secondary 
franchise were “permissive and not compulsory,” whereas the Subway Laws were “the 
first compulsory law requiring overhead lines to be put underground in cities of over 
500,000 inhabitants.”58 The court stated that “[Holmes’] acts were not voluntary but 
in obedience to the statutes and authorities established [under the Subway Laws] . . . . 
The consent of the city authorities was not necessary to do that which the law 
commanded.”59
47. 111 N.Y. 1, 38 (1888).
48. Id. at 39.
49. Id. at 39–40.
50. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *20–21, 40.
51. Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 422–23. 
52. Id. at 414–15.
53. Id. at 415.
54. Id. at 415, 426.
55. Id. at 415–16, 444.
56. Id. at 423.
57. Id. at 421–22.
58. Id. at 421.
59. Id. at 422. It is not clear why the court interpreted the Subway Laws, which “commanded” that 
aboveground lines be removed to underground, to displace the command of TCL section 102 (now 
section 27) to obtain city permission before laying any such lines under city streets. The court’s 
conclusion is especially questionable in light of the Subway Laws language that any permit to remove 
aboveground lines to underground, “shall be subject to the rules and regulations, not inconsistent 
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 Relying on Ghee, O’Brien, and Holmes, the court in Verizon held that Verizon 
possessed a state franchise in perpetuity because (1) the permission was the final step 
in creating a state franchise for laying lines beneath city streets, and (2) that final 
step, by its terms, did not contain any temporal limitations.60 The Verizon holding 
interprets TCL section 27 to say that no matter what the City Charter says is the 
power of a municipality to grant franchises for inalienable public rights-of-way, a 
secondary franchise is not subject to charter franchising requirements. Courts have 
held this to be true for only those telecommunications corporations organized under 
the TCL prior to the 1898 City Charter.61 For corporations, like Verizon, who were, 
or whose predecessors in interest were, incorporated prior to 1898, courts have 
uniformly held that they are not governed by temporal limitations. Courts reached 
this conclusion because prior to the 1898 Charter the charters for the city lacked 
explicit language that city streets were “inalienable”62 property.63 Conversely, for 
telecommunications companies incorporated subsequent to enactment of the 1898 
City Charter, courts have held that their permissions to lay lines are subject to 
temporal limitations.64
 The Verizon court, based on Holmes, held that enactment of the Subway Laws 
also gave Verizon a state franchise to lay lines underneath city streets in Brooklyn.65 
The court relied specifically on Holmes language that the “consent of the city 
authorities was not required to do that which the law commanded,”66 despite the fact 
that the New York and New Jersey Telephone Company (“NYNJT”), consolidation 
with which gave Metro its Brooklyn telephone and telegraph business, had never 
herewith, prescribed or to be prescribed by the local authorities having control of such streets, avenues 
and other highways in such city . . . .” 1885 N.Y. Laws 852, 853. The Subway Laws provided that 
aboveground lines be placed underground, but placed regulation of that process in a local Board of 
Commissioners of Electrical Subways, thus evincing a desire to keep management of laying lines under 
city streets under the control of city authorities.
60. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *21–22.
61. Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 420–21.
62. “Inalienable” means “[n]ot transferable or assignable.” Black’s Law Dictionary 345 (3d pocket ed. 
2006).
63. See In re N.Y. Indep. Tel. Co., 118 N.Y. at 294 (holding that whatever rights NYT possess in city streets 
exists by virtue of its predecessor-in-interest’s 1894 incorporation, which was prior to the 1898 Charter) 
(citing People ex rel. Indep. Tel. Co. v. Monroe, 30 N.Y. L.J. 488, aff ’d, 86 N.Y.S. 1143 (1904) (realtor 
incorporated in 1899 could receive rights to use streets only in accordance with the provisions of the 
1898 Charter)).
64. Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 422 (“Any company incorporated after [the 1884 Subway Laws] 
would . . . be obliged to comply with the subway act provisions, obtain the consent of the municipality, 
and, since the adoption of the [1898 Charter], comply with [City Charter franchising requirements].”); 
In re N.Y. Indep. Tel. Co., 118 N.Y.S. at 294 (holding that NYT had no rights from its own incorporation 
because it incorporated in 1905, by which time the 1898 City Charter was in effect).
65. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *27.
66. Id. at *27 (quoting Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 422).
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obtained permission to lay underground lines from the common council of 
Brooklyn.67
 The problem with the Verizon holding is that it implies a grant in perpetuity 
from a resolution in which no such language is evident, and ignores the five-year 
limit on city permissions required by the City Charter of 1873. The result undermines 
the public’s ability to secure reasonable and adequate compensation for the use of city 
streets. TCL section 27 specifically states that both incorporation under that section 
and consent from the city is necessary to lay lines under city streets.68
 When the city granted Metro permission to lay lines under its streets, the 1873 
Charter specifically stated that the city could not grant franchises or permissions for 
a period longer than five years.69 Given that the city government exercises its powers 
only to the extent allowed by state law (i.e., the City Charter), a reasonable assumption 
is that the Board of Aldermen would have understood their permission to Metro to 
be governed by the City Charter. 70 Further, a safer assumption is that if the Board of 
67. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *25. The law also commanded that telecommunications 
companies obtain permission from municipal authorities before laying any lines below Brooklyn streets. 
N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 27.
68. N.Y. Transp. Corp. Law § 27. One rationale articulated in support of holding that the Subway Laws 
usurped the clear requirement of city permission under TCL section 27 is that “the state had full control 
over the streets of the city of New York and could grant [the company rights to use city streets] without 
the consent of the municipality[.]” Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 420. While this is a sound 
principle—that when the state legislature grants a municipality control over its streets that power exists 
concurrently with state power over municipal streets—it ignores that the state legislature did not step in 
and displace the requirement of city permission under TCL section 27. In other words, while the state 
could have directly granted permission to companies incorporated under the TCL to lay lines under city 
streets, it did not do so; it instead set up a two-step process: (1) incorporation under TCL, and (2) 
consent of the city’s common council.
69. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *3–4 n.2.
70. Town of Black Brook v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 486, 488 (1977) (“A local government is merely a political 
subdivision created by the sovereign state.”); Di Prima v. Wagner, 215 N.Y.S.2d 705, 709 (1st Dep’t 
1961), aff ’d, 10 N.Y.2d 728 (1961) (“The granting of city charters is purely a legislative function . . . .”); 
Incorporated Village of Atlantic Beach v. Kimmel, 18 N.Y.2d 485, 488 (1966) (the powers of municipal 
corporations are such as are provided by the statutes under which they are constituted); Seaman v. 
Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94 (1965) (“It is axiomatic that local governmental units are creations of, and 
exercise only those powers delegated to them by, the State . . . .”); Albany County v. Hooker, 204 N.Y. 
1, 9–10 (1912) (“The state, in the exercise of its sovereign power . . . has divid[ed] its territory into 
counties and impos[ed] on them certain governmental powers and duties.”); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, Towns of E. Greenbush., Renesselear County v. Allen, 276 N.Y.S.2d 234, 237 (3rd Dep’t 
1966), aff ’d, 20 N.Y.2d 109 (1967), aff ’d, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (“the municipality . . . is the creation of 
the state . . . .”); Brooklyn City R. Co. v. Whalen, 182 N.Y.S. 283 (2d Dep’t), aff ’d, 229 N.Y. 570 (1920) 
(the New York City Charter, “and other general and specific laws applicable to it, are the measure of 
[the city’s] powers.”); People ex rel. Elkind v. Rosenblum, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 295, 298 (Sup. Ct. Westchester 
County 1945), aff ’d, 295 N.Y. 929 (1946) (“The city, which is a municipal corporation, is a creature of 
the law. The law defines its powers and duties. It has no more right to act in excess of the powers 
granted to it than has a private corporation.”); John F. Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal 
Corporations § 538 (1872) (“As the highways of a state, including streets in cities, are under the 
paramount and primary control of the legislature, and as all municipal powers are derived from the 
legislature, it follows that the authority of municipalities over streets, and the uses to which they may be 
put, depend entirely upon their charters or legislative enactments applicable to them.”).
1182
ciTY oF New York v. veriZoN New York, iNc.
Aldermen knew that absent explicit language of temporal limitation in the resolution 
Metro and its successors-in-interest would never have to come back to the city to 
renegotiate, then the Board would have elected to include such language. The only 
language in the 1881 permission referring to time was that Metro would have 
permission to “from time-to-time” lay lines underground.71 The Verizon court held 
that because there was no language specifically limiting the permission, the grant 
was intended to be perpetual.72 A better interpretation of city permissions under 
TCL section 27 would require that, in order for a permission to one company to be 
perpetual, the municipal consent must mention that it extends rights to the company’s 
successors and assigns.73 There is no language in the 1881 permission extending it to 
Metro’s successors and assigns.74
 The law essentially stands as thus: Any telecommunications corporation existing 
prior to enactment of the Subway Laws does not need permission from the city to lay 
its lines below city streets so long as in 1884 the population of the borough in question 
equaled or exceeded 500,000 inhabitants. For telecommunications corporations 
organized subsequent to the enactment of the Subway Laws, but prior to enactment 
of the 1898 City Charter, access to lay lines beneath city streets must be based on a 
state franchise, the final step of which is permission from the city. Such a franchise 
exists in perpetuity. And for telecommunications corporations organized after 1898, 
access to lay lines below city streets must be based on city permission and its franchise 
is not perpetual—it must regain permission from the city pursuant to the temporal 
limitations in the charter for city franchises.
 The anomaly is that no matter which of these three categories a telecommunications 
company falls into, its burden on city streets is the same,75 and thus the city’s need to 
manage its streets does not change. Yet, courts have changed the city’s ability to 
manage its streets by categorizing that ability not according to the burdens placed on 
71. 1881 Resolution, supra note 25.
72. Verizon, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4572, at *21–22.
73. See, e.g., City of Covington v. So. Covington & Cin. St. Ry. Co., 246 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1918) (holding 
city franchise was in perpetuity because the city permission was to railroad company’s “successors and 
assigns” and the permission stated that it was for “all the right and authority that [the city had] the 
capacity to grant”); City of Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 66 (1913) (holding 
grant by city ordinance to telephone company and its successors and assigns to occupy city streets was a 
franchise in perpetuity, unless restricted by some limitation by the state on the city’s corporate powers); 
People ex rel. Pearce v. Commercial Tel. & Tel. Co., 115 N.E. 379, 382 (Ill. 1917) (holding municipal 
grant of permission was not transferable because it lacked language extending to telephone company’s 
successors and assigns).
74. See 1881 Resolution, supra note 25.
75. A city franchise to use public rights-of-way confers three rights of use:
 (a) the option to place facilities throughout the public rights-of-way, and thus to burden 
those rights-of-way; (b) the right to create actual burdens on the public rights-of-way 
through the construction work to install and maintain such facilities, and the continuing 
occupation of limited space in the streets; and (c) the ability to use the public rights-of-
way in doing business.
 Ellrod & Miller, supra note 6, at 489.
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public rights-of-way and the benefits private companies realize from that use, but 
rather on factors such as when a telecommunications company was incorporated, 
when that company erected telegraph and telephone lines above ground, and when 
the state legislature saw fit to codify the common law principle of inalienable 
municipal streets.
 The important practical effect of the Verizon court’s construction is that the city must 
periodically litigate whether it is receiving adequate and reasonable compensation for a 
telecommunications corporation’s access and use of public rights-of-way. A better 
interpretation of TCL section 27 is one that not only comports with the plain language 
of that section, but also aligns construction of that section with the mandate of the 
Subway Laws that telecommunications infrastructure be placed underground, the general 
principle, codified in the 1898 City Charter, that public rights-of-way are inalienable, 
and charter temporal limitation requirements on city franchises, which have always 
existed. As the law stands now, courts have construed TCL section 27 such that its 
provisions gut the language and purpose of some of these other state laws.
 The purpose of charter franchise requirements, and of codifying the common 
law principle that city streets are inalienable, is to allow municipalities to protect 
public rights-of-way and ensure the public receives adequate and reasonable 
compensation for its use. The problem is not the ability to lay lines—a reasonable 
construction of TCL section 27 would be an interpretation prohibiting the city from 
unreasonably denying permission to use city streets. But by construing TCL section 
27 in a way that preserves municipal control over public rights-of-way, and thus 
requiring special franchises granted pursuant to TCL section 27 to be revisited at the 
expiration of whatever temporal limitation the City Charter sets for city franchises, 
the courts would allow a system for regular review of the compensation received for 
access to city streets by telecommunications companies. Under such a rule, the public 
continues to enjoy its right to be adequately and reasonably compensated for use of its 
public rights-of-way.
 Additionally, as the space under city streets becomes scarcer, corporations will 
pay higher amounts for the use of that scarce resource. This is sound policy from a 
standpoint of economic efficiency.76 By requiring telecommunications companies—no 
matter when they were incorporated—to pay fair market value for the public property 
they use, resources are allocated most fairly, and investment in alternatives to market 
participants is attracted based on their actual price.77 More important, perhaps, is 
that this alternative interpretation of use of public rights-of-way by telecommunications 
companies preserves the fundamental principle that the primary purpose of city 
streets is travel, and thus any grant of privilege to use streets for another purpose be 
construed “against the grantee and in favor of the public.”78
76. See id. at 497–98.
77. See id.
78. Holmes Elec. Protective Co., 228 N.Y. at 447 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (quoting Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 49 (1891) and citing Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 544 (1837)).
